This article analyses family emancipation and the transition from school to work in the context of transition to adulthood in Catalonia, and discusses some central issues of youth sociology. The data used have been provided by the 2002 Catalan Young People Survey (Casal et al., 2004) , carried out in 2002 and 2003, which was commissioned by the Catalan government and managed by the Education and Work Research Group (Autonomous University of Barcelona). The survey was done with a representative sample of 2000 young people from Catalonia aged between 15 and 29. This article explains the postponement of leaving home, the new degrees of autonomy managed by young people and the relationship between the age of emancipation and the complexity of transition from school to work. Finally, we highlight some conclusions with regard to the theoretical framework and policy-making issues.
INTRODUCTION
This article presents the results of a research project carried out in 2002 and 2003. The study was done with a representative sample of 2000 young people from Catalonia 1 aged between 15 and 29. The design of the research enabled us to develop a theoretical framework on the transition to active life from a biographical point of view -a subject on which our research group has been working since the 1980s. 2 We had prepared a questionnaire from a longitudinal point of view and gathered recent data on the social reality of young Catalans. We highlight the study of Catalonia as a case within the European context but, when data are available, we make some comparisons with other studies.
The article has three sections. The first one is an outline of the theoretical framework that justifies our epistemological and methodological choices in the context of a theoretical discussion about the concept of youth transition. The second section focuses on aspects related to the autonomy of young people, particularly on issues related to everyday life. Increasing autonomy among young people has been a fact that has provoked the emergence of agency in the explanation of transition. In the third section, we relate the processes of autonomy acquisition with family emancipation and the transition to working life, namely, the relation between social constraints related to the educational system and the labour market, and the opportunities deriving from both. To conclude, we summarize several considerations that are relevant to policy-making.
THEORETICAL ISSUES OF YOUTH SOCIOLOGY
To be young involves a recognition of a social status attached to an implicit system of standards and requirements. Individuals are young when they are a certain age or they comply with some social conditions defined by adults according to indications of status and roles (Allerbeck and Rosenmayr, 1979) . Statistically, and according to administrative institutions, young people are classified as an age group between 15 and 29 years old (Youth Department, Eurostat) . But this is a consideration that can change according to the geographical context and historical period. The identification between youth and a specific age group is a consequence of the political action of institutions or of empirical needs, but it is not a sociological concept in itself.
Traditionally, sociological theories have defined youth as an age group or a life stage (Bendit and Hein, 2004) . The analysis of youth as an emerging reality in industrial societies has been largely influenced by structural and functionalist theories based on an adultocratic point of view focusing on the formal rites of passage and normative deviations of young people (Feixa, 2002; Pugeault-Cicchelli et al., 2004) . During the 1960s, the social movements led by young people (i.e. the students' movement) and critical theory changed the traditional point of view from the trajectory of life course to generation. Borrowing the concept of generation from Karl Mannheim, young people began to be viewed as a new generation who illustrated values of social change and, according to 'instrumental Marxism', even a new social class (Feixa, 2002) .
Both approaches share the same handicap: the homogenization of young people and externalization of young people by social structure (Baudelot and Establet, 2000) .
We think, on the contrary, that youth is a phenomenon linked to social structure, not something outside it, and that it has a cultural and historical dimension (Casal et al., 2004) . 3 The passage from puberty to emancipation from the family is formed socially within a specific socio-political framework and a political transition system. The key issues of this framework are the development of the education systems, the development of the labour market, the role of the family and the role of the state in these systems. We can find differences between countries in the evolution of these issues. Some authors state that, in Italy for example, there is a connection between the strong role of the family, the weak development of social benefits and of vocational training, and the high level of on-the-job training in the configuration of young people's transition, which is late and with a strong family dependence. In contrast, Germany would represent a strong welfare state, with a high level of vocational training (dual system) very much linked with the labour market, with the family having a weak role (Walther et al., 2002: 55) . In this context, young people will leave their parents' home early. Catalonia and, of course, Spain would be closer to Italy (Jurado, 2001; Walther et al., 2002) .
The role of the institutional framework of transition does not allow us to forget the role played by individuals who build their itineraries of passage combining choices and social constraints. Itineraries are independent of neither social inequalities such as class, gender and ethnic divisions, nor segmentation processes in training and work. But young people play an active role in building their itineraries using strategies and choices, and they may also have good or bad luck. This approach is called by some authors 'choice biography' (Du Bois-Reymond, 1995) according to the perspective of non-linear transitions in post-industrial societies, or 'do it yourself' biographies within the framework of 'second modernity' or late modernity (López Blasco, 2003) . However, the consequences of the recent social changes in the itineraries to adulthood constructed by young people can be understood in a different way. These itineraries are embarked upon by young people in a context of vulnerability, risk and uncertainty (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997) , and the increasing complexity could imply no choice for some young people, as the 'choice biography' seems to suggest (Du Bois-Reymond, 1995) . The biographical approach also implies a methodological issue -to analyse youth, longitudinal tools are necessary to measure the itineraries. In this sense, empirical data show that 'most youth transitions still follow the traditional path to adulthood' (Bendit and Hein, 2004: 179) in almost every European country. Indeed, the increasing complexity does not mean that linear transition has disappeared, on the contrary, we might find a large group of young people making their transition to adulthood according to traditional patterns (we see this regarding Catalan young people in the last section). Furthermore, not all the itineraries in industrial societies have been linear; the analyses made during the 1960s and the 1970s probably over-stated it, but in a deeper analysis we might also find some complex features, such as a more active role of agency (Furlong and Cartmel, 1997) .
THE AUTONOMY OF YOUNG PEOPLE
The prolongation of youth is a common phenomenon in modern societies (Cavalli and Galland, 1993 ) but we do not have a simple explanation for this. During the 1970s and the 1980s, it was associated with the crisis of the labour market and the increase in youth unemployment (Prieto Lacaci, 1996) . Later on, post-modern theory related this phenomenon to the change in the values and expectations of young people. The current explanation is the high prices of flats and the difficulty of obtaining housing, especially in Spain, given the lack of a low rent market. The role of the welfare state and social benefits is also a controversial issue. The provision of social care could be explained as a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one, because the extension of youth is also a phenomenon in countries with a strong welfare state (Cavalli and Galland, 1993) .
It seems necessary to go beyond the linear relationship between these variables. The process of emancipation from the family, which has become protracted, is related to the progressive acquisition of degrees of autonomy: from emotional, material and logistical dependence on the family to the autonomous management of the relations with family, time, space and resources. This means that young people have more freedom than before to make decisions regarding their life, to choose studies and partners, and how to spend their money. This autonomy has increased lately and has been consolidated and legitimized (Casal et al., 2004) . This section will be devoted to these aspects.
To live with one's parents or to live independently
Initially, we analysed the unit of young people living together. As we can see in Figure  1 , from the 2000 people interviewed (between 15 and 29 years old), 82 per cent are living with their parents and 18 per cent have emancipated or semi-emancipated lives. The predominant pattern of emancipation is a couple living in new housing (66%), two-thirds of them having elected to marry. The rest of the emancipated young people (30%) have chosen an individual or collective pattern. Sometimes, the line between moving out and living in their parents' home is not clear. There are situations that we have called semi-emancipated or semi-independent, which are represented by a small group (a little more than 10 per cent of the emancipated young people) who live in student housing or shared apartments. They are young people (Casal et al., 2004) who either combine this experiment of independence with living in their parents' homes during the weekends, or receive material and 'logistic' support from their parents (mainly from the mothers). Among young people living in their parents' home, 35 per cent envisaged moving out in the short-term. Interestingly, only 25 per cent of this group wanted to achieve this through marriage. This means that the expectations of young people are far from traditional, but most likely family circumstances encourage the ritualization of emancipation (the economic advantages of these rituals are not negligible). Sixty-five per cent of the young people living with their parents do not expect to move out in the short term. These young people give three reasons to justify remaining in their parents' home: they consider themselves to have the age but conditions are not favourable (44%); they still feel too young (35%); or they have the age but the moment is not right (21%). According to these data, we can say that objective restrictions make emancipation difficult for many young people, but the delay goes beyond the difficulties imputed to the acquisition of goods or to economic difficulties. If not, we could not understand why young people with a job (even a permanent job) remain in their parents' home until they are 30 or 35 (Cavalli, 2000) . In addition, it is unclear why, in some contexts, the difficulties, namely housing, do not cause the postponement of emancipation as they did in the European post-war period or do today in post-socialist countries (Cunningham, 2000) .
Relative autonomy
Relative autonomy is the capacity of young people to act upon their decisions related to family life, studies, leisure time, financial expenditures and so on. This capacity has increased in recent decades, consolidated itself and become legitimate with little likelihood of reversing. The indicators available in research to measure the relative autonomy of young people are limited, but the results are clear: the situation of young people compared to that of their families has changed drastically. Nowadays, they have a great deal of freedom of choice and action. Moreover, this freedom has extended to larger groups like teenagers, working-class boys and girls and so on. This increase in autonomy may explain the positive evaluation made by young people when they are questioned about the relationship with their family.
In the table we can observe how these young people's evaluation of family relationships is positive or very positive. Perhaps this evaluation is influenced by the fact that 90 per cent of young people have their own space (a room) in their parents' home. For this reason, the need to look for their own home has decreased. According to Alessandro Cavalli: Thanks to the improvement in the housing conditions of middle-class families, most young people have their own space, a room furnished according to their own taste, in which they can enjoy the possibility of inviting male and female friends, without any previous permission or control of the parents. (2000: 204) Among the young people who envisage short-term emancipation, there is a small percentage of negative evaluations, but it is nevertheless a clear minority. Although they represent a very small group (for this reason they do not appear in the table), the young people whom we called semi-emancipated are those who evaluate the relationship with their families more highly. In these cases, distance probably helps to reduce tensions. The change in the evaluation of the family is more significant in Catalonia and Spain because the age of emancipation is later than in northern countries, like Britain and Norway (Holdsworth, 2003) , as we will see later.
Data show that the changes that took place inside the families improve understanding between the parents and their offspring, although it is possible that individual answers were exaggerated. Assuming this small bias, it seems that there is a good family atmosphere, which explains a greater degree of relative autonomy for young people, especially compared to previous generations. Today, parents relinquish certain forms of control and authority, and they recognize the relative autonomy of their sons and daughters -although this has not happened without tensions and the parents' having to accept controversial situations. Parents have, indeed, accepted some risks and have assumed that freedom of action has to be obtained soon (in adolescence) and without much distinction between boys and girls. The relative autonomy of young people living with their parents is a fact, and the differences between northern and southern countries are decreasing, although some researchers still focus on the importance of the 'familistic' way of life in Spain and of individualism in modern countries (Gaviria, 2003; Thomsin et al., 2003) . According to Galland, in the south of Europe, young people are more independent in their parents' home than are young people are in the north (Galland, 2000: 190) .
These data show two clear conclusions: young people recognize that they have relative autonomy and they use it. However, several differences based on age and sex still remain. Adolescents at home have more restrictions with regard to coming back late and fewer resources available. Nevertheless, situations of great autonomy are present: for example, 67 per cent of the young people aged between 16 and 18 say they return home late, without time limitations. When a young person is 18 years old, the degree of relative autonomy is high, and when he or she is 27-29 years old, it is total. The freedom girls today experience is great compared to preceeding generations. They have obtained margins of autonomy similar to those of boys, although there is still a 'small difference': more time restrictions and more control of resources. The degree of choice regarding expenditures, studies and leisure time is similar for both girls and boys.
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Economic independence
Economic independence is an important link in the chain leading to emancipation, although we find situations of family emancipation with economic dependence. These situations, which were strong in traditional societies in which the transmission of the inheritance and the control of the male 'heir' was so important, are currently receding. Usually, the progressive acquisition of autonomy and the margin of freedom of choice are followed by economic independence. Relative autonomy is acquired either through weekly pocket money or through some economic assistance from the family, whereas total independence is acquired in the ordinary labour market. The measure of economic independence and of the age of acquisition of this independence is somewhat complicated because we used subjective data. Moreover, like family independence, economic independence is not a binary variable. We found some intermediate situations or semi-independence, as we see in Table 3 .
Obviously, the acquisition of economic independence takes place according to the age of young people. At 15 years old, 90 per cent of young people fully depend on To get back home at dawn on the weekend 7 9 84 100
To have resources for leisure time expenditures at 4 9 87 100 the weekend
To have freedom to decide weekend leisure activities 3 9 87 100
To have freedom of expenditure in everyday life 3 8 89 100
To have the freedom of decision-making in studies 1 4 95 100 and work Source: 2002 Young Catalan People Survey (Casal et al., 2004) Transition from dependence to semi-independence (own resources plus family help) 18
Progressive and gradual transition to economic independence (through intermediate 21 forms) Direct transition from dependence to independence (through work) 31
Regressions of independence to new economic dependence forms 2
More complex modes 3
Total 100 the family, whereas, at 29 years old, 90 per cent of young people are completely independent, as is evident in Figure 2 .
The age of emancipation
Age is a very important expression of the diversity of family emancipation processes. Our data allow us two ways of studying the age of emancipation. First, we could consider only the young people who are already emancipated -there are 400 cases in our sample and we classify them in four groups, depending on the age when they left their parents' home. The first group, 22 per cent, have moved out before the age of 20 and therefore we have labelled them the 'early emancipation group'. The second group, 36 per cent, is composed of the young people emancipated between 21 and 24 years old, and have been labelled the 'pre-modal emancipation group'. The third group, emancipated between 25 and 27 years old, are called the 'modal emancipation group', which accounts for 33 per cent of the sample. The last group, 9 per cent of the sample, is made up of the young people who became emancipated between 28 and 29 years old -the 'delayed emancipation group'. The second way of understanding the age of emancipation is to see the proportion of young emancipated people in every age cohort as it appears in Figure 3 (p. 41).
We observed how, before the age of 24, the proportion of emancipated young people is under or nearly 10 per cent. The significant increase begins at 25 years old and it steadily rises. However, we can see that 40 per cent of young people still live at their parents' home at 29 years of age. This is one of the most surprising phenomena within the European context: Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece are the European countries with the highest rate of young people living in their parents' home -50 per cent or more of the young people aged between 25 and 29 were in this situation in 1995. In contrast, less than 20 per cent of young people still lived at their parents' home in the United Kingdom, France and The Netherlands (Galland, 2000) . This is generating an important debate on the role of the family, welfare state benefits and the housing market (Oinonen, 2003) . Nevertheless, late emancipation is (Casal et al., 2004) not a new phenomenon; it was very common in pre-industrial societies. Early emancipation has been an historical exception during the 1950s and 1960s (Oinonen, 2003: 124) .
In fact, the extension of emancipation beyond 30 years old, in terms of age cohorts, does not stop and is probably not reversible. It does not seem as if the factors that provoke early emancipation will increase in the future -the difficulties of consolidating a solid status in the labour market, the difficulties of renting or buying a flat and the lack of pressure from the parents to leave home. These factors also appear with regard to girls who, owing to marriage, traditionally left home before boys.
FROM SCHOOL TO WORK TRANSITION AND FAMILY EMANCIPATION
In this section, we relate the age of emancipation to the transition from school to work. As a result of this relation, we have built singular itineraries of young people that we have classified in four 'modalities of transition', namely, basic ways of building their future. We have used the conceptual framework from Casal 4 and tried to put our results in his framework. In fact, it is a heuristic exercise that enables us to identify the basic ways in which young people describe their itineraries of work, family and social integration. The typology has been developed through two variables, which make it possible to disperse or concentrate young people in a twodimensional space. The vertical axis is defined by a variable that polarizes complex insertions (shows positions of professional success and likelihood of reaching it) or simple insertions (school drop-outs, lower qualifications). The horizontal axis is defined by the age of family emancipation, earlier or later. The combination of these two axes defines a space in which itineraries are located. If there were dispersion and total individualization, there would be a great distance and a random distribution between the individuals; but if the individuals tend to form proximity clouds, the basic modalities of transition to adult life can be identified.
The following diagram is an expression of this kind of analysis. The vertical axis (Casal et al., 2004) identifies the variable 'expectations of transition' and the social position (high or low); the horizontal axis identifies the variable 'age of emancipation' such as we have previously defined (early, pre modal and modal to define early, delayed or not reached emancipation, to define late emancipation). Therefore, we have four dimensions: complex or simple transition and early or late emancipation.
To carry out the analysis, we took a sub-sample of young people aged between 26 and 29 (624 individuals) who had more time to build their itineraries. However, only 424 of them have spent a long time in the labour market and, therefore, could be definitively classified. These individual modalities are given as a percentage within a circle. The rest of the cases, 200 individuals, have been classified according to their probable future work status. For example, young people who are still studying are classified in a complex insertion, and the young people who have been out of the labour market for a long time are classified in a simple insertion. The percentage sum of all cases is represented in the square.
Finally, we can describe the four modalities of transition as a result of a combination between the variables defined above.
Early success (12-15%)
This is the modality that gathers the young people who were emancipated from the family before 28, have successfully followed a long training itinerary (generally, higher education) and have an ascending professional mobility. In this modality, the young people of the middle class are over-represented and working-class young people are under-represented. Men and women are equally represented in this modality, although there is a slight difference in favour of young women. 
Figure 4 Modalities of transition
Source: 2002 Young Catalan People Survey (Casal et al., 2004) 
Working trajectory (27-30%)
This modality includes the young people who were emancipated from the family before 28 and who follow a professional itinerary based on occupational options that do not require higher education. Some of these young people have descended in their job status, but most of them have undergone a professional insertion based on lowly qualified jobs. Although this modality is related to working-class origins, there are also some young people who come from more upper-class families. These data prove the phenomenon of downward social mobility or the extension of vulnerability also to young people with high economic and cultural capital. We should also note that there is some over-representation of women compared to men.
Successive approach 5 (20-24%)
The delay in emancipation and the paths to professionalism (university studies, professional itineraries of success and ascending professional mobility) describe the strategies of tests or 'successive approaches'. It is an inter-class modality, although there is a significant over-representation of young people from the middle and upper classes. In the current context and in the following years, this modality will probably be more compatible with future young people. Young women are more represented than young men, and this fact will change the building of professional status and, as a consequence, it will change other aspects of everyday life.
Precarious trajectory (34-38%)
This describes the non-emancipated young people, those who became emancipated late and those who have either undergone job status decline or remain in the unskilled labour market. The rise in precarious itineraries (and worse, non-structured trajectories) since the 1990s is related to the precariousness of the labour market and the high costs of housing. Precariousness occurs mainly among the young people with a low level of education and who have developed trajectories of school failure; however, it also includes some young people who are in secondary school and even in higher education. These trajectories include more boys than girls and they are predominant among the young people of low social origins, although they are also found in other social groups.
We have no data from previous surveys for comparison in order to assess which modalities are increasing and which are decreasing. But we hypothesize that early success and working trajectories were predominant in industrial and corporate capitalism, and that the successive approach and precarious trajectories are emerging in informational capitalism (Casal, 1996 (Casal, , 1999 . This could be in tandem with social changes, such as the increase in the choices of young people's biographies, the deregulation of the labour market and, consequently, the increase in vulnerability and risk (Du Bois-Reymond, 1995; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997; Furlong et al., 2003) .
CONCLUSION
In this article we have shown the recent changes in the acquisition of autonomy among Catalan young people. Now we summarize the main conclusions resulting from our data and some political implications. The extension of youth has made the emergence of new forms in the process of acquiring autonomy to achieving full emancipation possible. The building of trajectories to adult life is also more complex than it was three or four decades ago, and the outcome of these trajectories is not always found in the traditional reproduction of social structure. First, all the trajectories of success are not concentrated among middle-class young people nor are working-class young people condemned to the secondary labour market. This fact leads to the conclusion that using autonomy (in the choice of studies, leisure activities, the marriage market) might be a key for upward or downward social mobility. Second, boys have been overtaken by girls in the more successful trajectories, and there are no significant differences in emancipation patterns. This phenomenon is common in other countries -girls are increasingly able to construct choice-based trajectories because they are less limited by class, religion and gender orientation (Du Bois-Reymond et al., 2001: 34) . Nevertheless, this process decreasing differentiation between girls and boys has a counterpart: a progressive differentiation among girls (Schoon et al., 2001: 8) . The use of autonomy by girls is probably an irreversible fact (the debate on the access of women to education is old, although some inequalities still remain) and new relations between sexes might be possible. It might also be possible that these new relationships exist only during youth, as a result of the 'age effect' in the extension of emancipation. When motherhood comes, usually after the age of 30 in Catalonia and Spain, inequalities become stronger. Third, although ethnic inequality was not measured in our research, it is possible that family background will collide with trajectories that use the autonomy of young people fully. This phenomenon might be expressed in a new conflict between the first generation of immigrants and the second or third generations. We have also carried out a heuristic exercise relating family emancipation with the school-to-work transition. Each modality is interesting in itself and it even has significant implications for youth policies. In the classification of modalities, we envisage possible future scenarios regarding young people's autonomy. Full autonomy, reached in the success trajectory, corresponds sooner or later to the new constraints of work and family. However, in the trajectory showing more problems of insertion, the use of autonomy could show some inconsistency in the building of itineraries. A thorough study of the concept of precariousness is important, such as flexibility or stability, as a way of measuring the objective situation of young people, namely, how precariousness is accepted as a part of transition to adulthood. Our hypothesis about the increase in the successive approach is related to the increase in young people's freedom of 'choice'. We have discussed the suitability of this concept in the theoretical framework, but it seems that young people have more possibilities of trying and failing in regard to their options, and of trying again (and failing again). This is the basis of the successive approach -with the help of the family or/and public welfare in order to avoid the worse effects of failure.
Policy priorities should be emphasized to empower young people to manage their individual itinerary building, not necessarily by stimulating emancipation but by offering possibilities to avoid social exclusion. Policy-makers should tackle new forms of transition, but without forgetting the old ones. Perhaps policy issues should target the adjustment of the different groups according to their situation in the process of transition to adulthood and should avoid situations such some benefits are used by the young people who are better positioned in the labour market and who have a greater cultural capital.
Notes
1 Catalonia is an autonomous community located in the north-east of Spain. Autonomous communities were the way of recognizing the differences among territories and decentralizing some competencies, as expressed in the Spanish constitution in 1978. In some cases, they are stronger than the French Régions but less strong than the German Länder. In the communities that have their own language and a specific historical background, such as Galicia, the Basque Country and Catalonia, differences with other communities are stronger. Catalonia is one of the most industrialized communities as well as having a high income. From the sociological point of view, the process of modernization in social values and other social features has been stronger in Catalonia than in other communities. 2 Education and Work Research Group, Autonomous University of Barcelona. 3 In this sense, we should highlight the fact that young Catalans are found in the social structure of Catalonia (a similar structure to that of mature capitalist societies) that has undergone changes induced by information capitalism -a loss in the importance of industrial jobs in favour of services, both in companies and employees, an increase in the status of technicians and the self-employed to the detriment of that of blue collar workers, a diversification of the middle classes and a progressive disappearance of the social groups linked to the agricultural sector. Another important element influencing the social structure is the role of the welfare state -although with some delay compared to countries with more tradition in this regard and still with many insufficiencies. The welfare state has allowed, on the one hand, the growth in the highly qualified middle layers dedicated to health, education and social services, and, on the other, it has restrained social exclusion in the groups that are the target of social policies, although the insufficiency of social programmes still makes the family play a very important role in the provision of these services. Also notable is the increase in education, at a higher rate than in other European countries, which has been partly accompanied by the increase in the skills required in the labour market and the tertiarization of the economy, and which has had repercussions on the emancipation of young people, as we will see in this article. The progressive urban integration of the population, with a concentration of 80 per cent in the outskirts of the metropolitan area of Barcelona, and importantly, the movement of young people from rural areas (mostly those who study) to cities is having a great impact on the social structure. In short, these are the main characteristics of the social structure in which young Catalan people are found, a structure that conditions their opportunities and limits their choices (Casal et al., 2004: 61-72) . Other elements worth mentioning are the economic conjuncture and the migratory movements. In the last few years, Catalonia and Spain have grown at higher rates than the European average (between 2 and 3%), the labour market has shown great dynamism, which has lead to repercussions, for instance, on the fall of unemployment among young people. The migratory component of the Catalan population has always been present. About half the Catalan population were born or are descendants of people born in other areas of Spain, especially in the South, who emigrated massively during the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. In the last decade, the immigration from poor countries has increased (which is happening in other European countries as well), up to between 5 and 10 per cent of the population (depending on numbers of undocumented immigrants), who come mainly from Morocco and Latin
